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7The technicity in phenomenology 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines 
phenomenology as ‘the study of structures of 
consciousness as experienced from the first-person 
point of view’.1 This has led to phenomenology being 
characterised as ‘subjectivist’ and ‘introspective’ (as 
opposed to being objective and concerned with the 
‘external’ communicable reality of things). The point 
that Don Ihde makes in proposing a post-phenom-
enology2 – and one that will be reinforced here in 
looking at Heidegger’s space – is that phenomenol-
ogy, properly understood, is not about subjectivity 
in the conventional sense we think of it at all. It is 
relational and concerned first and foremost with the 
relations humans have with the world around them. 
It is not so much about introspection either, but about 
reflexivity, in that what one experiences is derived 
from the real and embodied relations (characterised 
as ‘intentionality’ in phenomenology) of the subject 
with other people and things in the environment. 
These relations have nothing to do with any internal 
or private Mind, but are lived out beyond the skin of 
the subject – and already in public. Phenomenology 
is concerned before anything else with these rela-
tions, and investigates not so much real things ‘in 
themselves’ as the conditions under which subject-
object relations (things to people) appear. Ihde goes 
on to emphasise the roles of objects, settings and 
technologies in his post-phenomenology – more so 
than is conventionally done in phenomenology. In 
so doing he takes phenomenology even further from 
its supposedly traditional subjectivist concerns and 
closer still to the technicity of a relational systemat-
ics. Ihde draws closer in fact to cybernetics as he 
schematises human-environment relations as a 
partial symbiosis of human plus artefact mediated 
through the relational constructions (and technolo-
gies) we use to achieve them.3 
This incorporation of technologies into a phenom-
enological ontology is still regarded as being 
unorthodox. When we look closely however at 
Heidegger’s phenomenology and his space of 
human involvement in the world, it seems that he 
clearly recognised the role of artefacts, technologies 
and objects all along – in fact that he placed tech-
nology at the centre of his understanding of knowing 
and being. Heidegger was all along developing a 
relational view of the world and of our place in it; 
one which understood us as living in a world fabri-
cated around techniques of being and knowing.
The idea of us and our world being co-constituted 
in a relational and dynamic unity may be held up by 
both phenomenology and cybernetics as an alter-
native metaphysics to the ‘ontological dualism’ of 
the Cartesian system, which understands matter 
and mind or substance and spirit as belonging to 
essentially separate realms – across the bounda-
ries of which we have to travel in order to make this 
us-world connection. But it is arguably the way this 
relational unity organises space and works itself out 
in the world as much as the fact of it that is inter-
esting and useful to us as urbanists. In our more 
conventional view of the urban world we inhabit, 
we set ourselves against the world as an indifferent 
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8The intersubjective realm in spaces of intention-
ality
Rather than trying to find experience in the gap 
between our situation in some external and abso-
lute space on the one hand and our psychological 
state on the other, Heidegger proposes we think 
of experience as well as the genesis of our being 
public and with others in terms of the way the 
world discloses itself to us differently from differ-
ent situations. Heidegger uses in fact no concept 
of consciousness at all in his system but replaces 
it with ‘a concept of existence as the mode of being 
of an entity for which the things with which it deals 
are there … in the mode of perceptual presence’.7 
This involves a direct relation between subject and 
the object of perception, action or attention in fields 
of presence where different things are revealed or 
disclosed from different positions. Certain things 
may become possible or coherent from particular 
positions while others remain foreclosed or inco-
herent. And there may be a certain objectivity or 
systematicity about these fields in which percep-
tions emerge as a public factor in a ‘politics’ of 
situated presence and appearance.
In phenomenology, ‘structures of conscious-
ness’ are approached, if we are to take our lead 
from Heidegger, in the first instance by recognis-
ing the enormous, though not obvious to us most 
of the time, gulf between things and the ‘being’ of 
things – between things and the way things are 
disclosed to us. Heidegger calls this ‘ontological 
difference’ and his argument really sets the tone 
for the whole question of our experience of reality. 
Basically, Heidegger argues, things themselves and 
independently of us are quite beyond our imagina-
tion, because in bringing them to our imagination, 
or even to our knowledge of their being, we incor-
porate them in an indissoluble unity (that intentional 
relation) with ourselves.8
From this point on, we begin relating to things in 
a direct active and spatial relation that is integral, 
materiality to be overcome by way of intelligence 
or wayfinding. Also, in our conventional view of our 
relations with other people we understand ourselves 
as joining with them in direct social bonds of affin-
ity or dependence. Both of these conventional 
views may have to be modified in the sort of urban 
space that emerges out of Heidegger’s thinking. I 
will argue that we may begin to understand the city 
much more precisely as fields of places or techni-
cal settings which emplace us in very particular and 
public and political ways.
Relationality is on the agenda in urbanism today. 
At the same time it is fair to say that most ‘network 
thinking’ comes nowhere near addressing the full 
consequences of relationality, which includes I will 
argue the idea that the city is not just an artefact 
in the sense that it is planned and designed by us, 
but also that it itself constitutes an unplanned but 
perfectly coherent dynamic, relational ‘body politic’ 
with an order and a unity born out of the techno-
logically mediated practice of everyday life within it. 
While we give much attention to the order of cities in 
larger global and regional configurations, and while 
we attempt to create ‘orderly’ urban places which 
engage with these spaces, we miss a great deal of 
the inherent order in the ‘messy’ reality of the world 
which goes on under our noses. It is in this reality 
that much of the business of supporting and main-
taining the global order in local lives and economies 
takes place – in the work and movements of millions 
of ordinary folk, as anthropologists4 and urbanists of 
a more anthropological bent5 have already articu-
lated. We are indeed very far from understanding 
these processes adequately and I don’t aim to 
address them all here. What I will propose though 
is that we may make a start in thinking about the 
orders that drive our cities by starting from the 
ground of the intentional relation that is the funda-
mental unit of phenomenology.6 
9insisting that our encounter with the world by way 
of the ready-to-hand or zuhanden comes first, and 
the present-at-hand or vorhanden is a derivation or 
construction out of this immediate active involve-
ment with things.10
In other words, we encounter the world first, for 
the most part quite unproblematically, immediately 
and practically – and we then begin, as and if the 
need arises, to order and make better sense of it. In 
fact, there is no place to begin outside of our actions 
and movements in real situations in the world, and 
these are in a continuous engagement not only in 
space but in a practical time which connects our 
past through the present to a future shaped by the 
intention of the movement itself. The key to under-
standing Heidegger’s theory of space therefore is 
his attempt to describe spatial experience without 
presupposing objective space, or in his own terms, 
‘world-space’. He attempts instead to describe a 
lived space from within the finite perspective of an 
active being. This is the space of a being continu-
ously engaged and to a large extent already familiar 
with the world through previous engagement with 
it. It is also a ‘subjective’ space in the sense that 
it represents a singular situated perspective on the 
world. 
A question arises therefore about where the 
‘public’ and the ‘social’ may be in all of this ready-
to-handness and direct and individual relations with 
an environment. The question is significant because 
Heidegger does not address himself simply to the 
private experience of reality Husserl was concerned 
with (Erlebnis), but also to Erfahrung, a notion of 
experience that addresses itself to a more collec-
tive understanding of what experience might be. 
Hubert Dreyfus understands a public understand-
ing of our existence as necessarily underlying 
Heidegger’s project and suggests therefore that a 
public space needs to be prioritised if Heidegger 
is to achieve his aim of showing how our situated 
existence is not only individual but also a public way 
personal and significant. Things may exist in some 
abstract sense apart from our consciousness of 
them, but the reality we deal in simply cannot be 
the absolute reality, Descartes imagined. Things 
always exist for us – and things also exist for us 
in a way they simply cannot for things that cannot 
develop intentional relations with other things. For 
Heidegger, Being itself ‘“is” only in the understand-
ing of those entities to whose Being something like 
an understanding of Being belongs’.9 Existence is 
neither an absolute or a neutral issue; existence 
matters for us, and as embodied, active, inquisitive 
beings, things ‘are’ in some very important sense 
in the way we form a relation with them and take 
them into our lives. Things are disclosed to us in 
this relation, and in our encounter with the world; 
they come to Being in this encounter, and it is here 
that a practical non-abstract (and pre-reflective or 
pre-representational) realism begins. I will propose 
that we may build a space of this encounter, and 
characterise the city as a space of encounter that 
brackets and specifies our experience of things and 
people in the world. 
This encounter works both individually, in a space 
of things ‘ready’ for immediate active incorporation 
in our lives – and then potentially collectively, in a 
space of things ‘present’ to us and for our more 
generalised, communicable and collective knowing 
of them. For Heidegger, our first relation with things 
in perception and action is an integral ecological 
relation with things ‘ready-to-hand’ or zuhanden. On 
the other hand we also construct spaces of relations 
with things in the world which makes them commu-
nicable and part of our knowledge. This is our 
relation with things ‘present-at-hand’ or vorhanden. 
Zuhanden space could be understood (in the sense 
that it works from a singular perspective) as being 
‘subjective’, while vorhanden space could be seen 
as being ‘collective’ or ‘public’ (again in a way that 
needs to be qualified as spatial). Heidegger there-
fore reverses the Cartesian priority of ‘objective’ or 
absolute space coming before ‘subjective’ space, 
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Heidegger’s prioritisation of the intentional rela-
tion of situated people with their environment – the 
space of ‘being-there’ or Dasein – does not relate at 
all, on Arisaka’s account, to ‘subjectivism’, and the 
direct intentional relation may be also already part 
of collective experience. Heidegger simply cannot 
be seen, according to Olafson, as an existentialist 
who places the perspective of the individual at the 
centre of the problem of being and of being social.16 
Rather, our being in the world with others (Mitsein) 
is a much more fundamental part of our being than 
we normally see or acknowledge: ‘Our being with 
other like entities is … a constitutive element in our 
own mode of being as it is in theirs; and it is one to 
which we cannot do justice as long as we approach 
it via traditional philosophical routes like the theory 
of empathy’.17 Olafson points out that in Heidegger, 
we are ‘for the sake of others’, and although 
Heidegger does not develop this idea further and we 
have no clear explanation of how Fürsorge (caring) 
for people or things is generated out of Mitsein, 
Olafson proposes taking Heidegger’s understand-
ing of caring as involving not ‘the peculiar binding 
character that is the hallmark of distinctively moral 
relationships’, but rather ‘the concept of truth as a 
partnership among human beings’.18 
The mutual bonds of intersubjectivity involve 
in other words not so much specific agreements, 
empathies and dependencies, as a more general 
agreement about the nature of the world between 
us. Olafson proposes we find a common ‘ground’ 
in the realm of what lies between human beings 
rather than in sets of rules or values or ‘strong ties’. 
He emphasises that this mode of being in the world 
as subject-entities with other entities, is one within 
which subjects and things develop a reciprocal pres-
ence to each other and where both self and others 
are disclosed. This reciprocity is so familiar to us, 
is so much what we are immersed in, that we lose 
sight of it and of the power it has to determine what 
the things around us are in their relations with other 
present things. This realm of commonality may even 
of being.11 But Heidegger doesn’t believe that we 
need a representational dimension to communicate 
between the private and the public – indeed he 
believes there cannot be a private experience that 
is not itself dependant on a public experience of the 
world. This seems to pose an irresolvable contra-
diction between a ‘private’ zuhanden space at the 
base of things and an idea of the ‘public’ coming 
first. Dreyfus goes so far as to argue that Heidegger 
is ‘fundamentally confused’12 in his prioritisation of 
a ‘subjectivist’ individual space and suggests that 
the simple relation of intentionality cannot therefore 
be the basis of our experience. For Dreyfus this 
basis (and the space) of existence (Dasein) rather 
depends on and is made intelligible by a singular 
notion of Man (das Man), captured in a realm of 
‘social’ norms and practices. This view is disputed 
by Frederick Olafson for one, who sees publicness 
as something coming before the social norms or 
practices of das Man.13 Olafson is in turn criticised 
for having a ‘subjectivist’ conception of Dasein.14
Yoko Arisaka, in commenting on this debate, 
argues that the disagreement concerns the space 
implied in Heidegger’s thinking, and the space 
indeed of people situated in the world. ‘Social prac-
tices’ need in the one view a shared ‘public’ space, 
while in the other they may exist quite adequately 
in the supposedly ‘subjective’ spatiality of individual 
existence – which is not by that account simply 
‘private’. Arisaka argues indeed that the categories 
of ‘public’ and ‘private’ as conventionally understood 
and spatialised are simply inappropriate for captur-
ing Heidegger’s sense of what belongs to shared 
and personal domains of existence. It is possible, 
according to her, ‘to save both of these domains 
without raising the question of priority and without 
presupposing an ‘over-individualized’ or ‘subjectivist’ 
Dasein. … the way Dasein is in the world maintains 
“equiprimordially” the space shared with others and 
the personal sense of spatiality. On this reading, 
Olafson’s “individualist” account need not commit 
him to a “subjective” conception of Dasein’.15
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Heidegger’s space
Heidegger himself offers an alternative to three 
older theories of absolute space, relational space, 
and Kantian space. He sets his own space against 
absolute space but incorporates aspects of both 
other spaces in his own. Absolute space is the famil-
iar Cartesian space as ‘container’. It serves as the 
framework for defining the positions and motions 
of objects within it. But absolute space itself exists 
independently of these objects and has a homoge-
neous structure and existence of its own. According 
to Leibniz on the other hand, space is relative, an 
order of coexistences. Relational space depends 
on its objects rather than coming before them, as 
it is nothing more than the relations between these 
objects. Space here is a property of the objects and 
there is no space above and beyond the configu-
rations of the objects themselves. However both 
absolute and relational ideas of space understand 
space to be, if not strictly material in the case of 
relational space, certainly absolutely objective and 
real. 
Kant however claimed that space was subjective 
rather than objective. He believed that space comes 
to existence in our knowing of things – actually in 
our intuitions based in our experience of the world. 
Space is an ‘internal’ representation of the things 
given in our senses and the way we make our 
experiences of things ‘outside’ ourselves coherent. 
According to Kant it is only from a human stand-
point that we can speak of space: space depends 
on an intuition and an oriented sense of the world 
which can only come from us. Without this intuition 
of coherence, which must be subjective, and there-
fore for Kant ‘interior’, ‘space stands for nothing 
whatsoever’. Two important points with regard to 
this ‘coherence’ is that in being subjective it is taken 
to be ‘internal’ and essentially a private experi-
ence, setting up the problem of the communication 
between an ‘interior’ consciousness and ‘external’ 
reality.
begin to be understood as having its own existence 
at a material and organisational level from which we 
cannot escape without losing vital components of 
what we are. We could begin to understand there 
to be something here that is concrete and historical, 
making of the collective and the public something 
that is developmental, fashioned in a relational 
space and in time between people – never in addi-
tion to ‘subjective’ life but always integral with it.19 
According to this argument, Dreyfus has simply 
not seen how little our conventional understanding 
of bounded ‘public’ and ‘individual’ spaces engage 
with the problem as outlined by Heidegger himself. 
This has to do with the peculiar nature of the rela-
tionality of Dasein, including the fact that individual 
intentionality relates to a public or collective realm 
of entities (including people) in a way that makes 
them mutually constitutive of each other. What 
is ‘out there’ – what we know and respond to – is 
a function, to a great degree, of us, while what is 
‘out there’ also conditions us as we encounter it. 
We need to follow the way the individual and the 
collective emerge in the production of present-at-
hand spaces in ready-to-hand spaces. We need 
to follow the way present-at-hand places may be 
seen as becoming (themselves being disclosed) 
in the ready-to-hand spaces of people engaged in 
everyday activities and in time. We may find that 
other problematic issues emerge with Heidegger’s 
space – but these arguably emerge out of the condi-
tions of our existence as spatial rather than ideal 
beings. If we live in relations of reciprocal presence, 
then the recognition of other beings and things as 
complementing and completing one’s own being is 
prior to substantive or absolute essences or rules 
of conduct or definitions of justice or whatever, and 
according to Olafson this strange mutually consti-
tuting individualisation of self and other needs far 
more attention than it has thus far received. 
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is also what happens when I set out for the super-
market or when I speak to someone on my phone 
or send an email. De-severance is the impulse of 
an action directed to a specific goal. It is directional, 
aimed toward something specific and within a region 
which references and is prepared for that action and 
makes it coherent. All action happens from a centre, 
towards completion, and through a region. 
World-space is our commonsense concep-
tion of space as a container: ‘the bench is in the 
lecture-room, the lecture-room is in the university, 
the university is in the city, and so on, until we can 
say the bench is “in world space”’.22 Heidegger also 
calls this space present-at-hand (vorhanden) and 
he understands it as being not so much always and 
already there, as Cartesian space is, but as some-
thing that emerges out of – or that we produce out 
of – the more primordial spatialities of action that 
we start with. Heidegger would understand Carte-
sian absolute space as being world-space, but the 
objects ‘in’ world-space come to be understood or 
intuited by us as being independent of the space that 
contains them. World-space is not the most original 
and primordial space therefore, but is rather the 
most synthetic, the most fabricated – and it remains 
founded on the spatiality of the actions of situated 
people. ‘It is because we act, going to places and 
reaching for things to use, that we can understand 
farness and nearness, and on that basis develop a 
representation of world-space at all. … our spatial 
notions such as “distance”, “location”, etc., [come] 
from a standpoint within the spatial relation of self 
(Dasein) to the things dealt with’.23
Regions are the spaces which distribute and 
locate the things we are involved with in our every-
day activities. The places we inhabit are defined not 
as bounded areas but as regions which emplace 
‘equipment’ that we deal with on an everyday basis. 
‘Equipment’ is the stuff we have or bring ready-to-
hand (zuhanden) in action, but that we also organise 
and take care of in a present-at-hand (vorhanden) 
Heidegger rejects the metaphysical dichotomy of 
subject and object along with the presuppositions of 
interiority and exteriority that go with it. The ques-
tion of the interiority of the subjective experience 
is one that had already been dealt with by Bren-
tano and Husserl, who understood intentionality 
as a ‘breaking out’ rather than a ‘dissolving’ of the 
world in consciousness. According to them, we are 
in the world, between things, amongst others, and 
consciousness is no more than a relation with the 
world. ‘Every mental phenomenon includes some-
thing as object within itself’20 – it is that intentional 
relation. Heidegger acknowledges therefore the 
human character of space and its role as a condi-
tion of experience, but sees it emerging in our action 
and our practical involvement in the world rather 
than as an interior construction or representation of 
an exterior reality. Heidegger is therefore not much 
interested in the Kantian question of whether space 
is intrinsically subjective or objective (or private or 
public); he is looking for the conditions under which 
our ideas of objectivity and subjectivity (or public 
or private) appear. He begins by looking at spaces 
in which concrete, historical human existence 
expresses itself and the way it is produced in every-
day actions. He looks especially for example at 
pre-reflective activities, such as walking and reach-
ing for things, in order to begin to elucidate a theory 
of lived space. Objective and subjective views of 
space turn out in his view to be practical orienta-
tions to the world rather than abstractions from 
these more primordial spatialities of lived action. 
Heidegger sees three different types of space 
being produced in our actions and perceptions. 
These are world-space, regions (Gegend), and the 
spatialities of situated action. These last are divided 
into that ‘breaking out’ (Ent-fernung; translated as 
‘de-severance’) and directionality (Ausrichtung). 
‘“De-severing” amounts to making the farness 
vanish – that is making the remoteness of some-
thing disappear, bringing it close’.21 De-severance 
is what happens when I reach for something, but it 
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involvement is about things in the world and not 
things in our heads. But this involvement with things 
also draws in the other things and their places that 
contribute to making that thing what it is for us in 
that particular context. What Heidegger is not 
talking about here is a subjective attitude in which 
something seems to be ‘close’ when it is actually far. 
The ‘closeness’ he is talking about is that which is 
the achievement of a specific perception or action 
in the course of doing things and in a region which 
locates both actions and things. It is tied up not 
with thinking or feeling as much as with a practical 
doing. It is a partially reflective, or even unreflec-
tive, practical getting on with things in a real world 
context of real things important for – and prepared 
for – the completion of real tasks. The region orients 
and organises the intention, attention and concern 
developed in the action, but the region also has a 
reality, or a mappability let’s say. Heidegger’s space 
becomes both subjective and objective. 
But these are also much more than spaces that 
simply are there. They are spaces we are involved 
with in our actions, and into which we put our 
attention and our intention. These spaces may be 
encountered in action, but they are already prac-
tical spaces for action before we encounter them. 
They are also spaces we care about and care for; 
we may and do construct, reconstruct, organise 
and reorganise them to make them ready and fit 
for the patterns of our activities. Heidegger used 
the example of the carpenter’s workbench, but we 
could imagine the office of an importer-exporter, 
or a well-provisioned and ordered kitchen – even 
the mobile telephone of a well-connected teenager. 
These spaces are prepared and equipped for our 
action – they are about doing things efficaciously as 
well as about knowing where things are and where 
we are with things, and are thus ‘cognitive’ in the 
sense that the spatial organisation itself is also part 
of our knowledge. But they are also entirely ‘exte-
rior’ and there is nothing here that corresponds to 
our conventional view of an ‘interior’ subjectivity. 
space. Regions are both the spaces of action and 
the functional spaces of work and everyday living 
that are themselves part of the organisation of those 
activities. They are already formalised and organ-
ised for action, and one of the most basic functions 
of regions, I will argue, is to reference or index the 
things we need and use in relation to other comple-
mentary things. Things don’t and cannot exist in 
isolation: they exist in relation to other things in our 
active engagement with them, and these relations 
contribute both to their constitution and their loca-
tions. Regions are backgrounds to the things we 
use in action but not neutral backgrounds; rather 
they are the backgrounds out of which things 
emerge as what and where they are. Regions are 
therefore fundamental to the being of things and 
places – they are in a sense the necessary other 
side of things; the ‘ground’ from which the ‘figure’ of 
the thing is disclosed.
What Heidegger is trying to capture here is a space 
which is a mode of our active existence, rather than 
a space independent of that existence. Any space of 
action and active knowing, he is saying, is already 
part of that action, and any space which doesn’t 
begin with that action will leave us again having to 
cross a gulf between intention and action, between 
knower and known. These spaces of action are not 
any ‘internal’ subjective construction or representa-
tion, but are out there in the world along with the 
action – and already in the present-at-hand spaces 
of the world we encounter. Things and their places 
become therefore very quickly not just relational but 
referential or indexical with respect to regions in our 
activities – they become spatial organisations which 
emplace things in relation to other things such that 
they are not just ready-to-hand in actions but also 
present-at-hand for action – that we may act on 
them knowingly, knowing where things are, where 
we are with things and how or where to go further. 
The thingness of things and the placeness of their 
places begin to be significant simply and only in the 
context of our involvement with them – while this 
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those actions. Heidegger’s central insight was in 
seeing just how much of what supports our being 
and action slips out of sight in its readiness-to-hand. 
He saw how much of our world consists of ‘equip-
ment’ for action and how the relation between the 
ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand was there-
fore crucial to understanding the spatial mode of our 
existence, while recognising that relationship would 
always be difficult for us to see. The being of things 
incorporated in our actions consists in their efficacy, 
not in any particular aspect of their make-up or even 
in the combination of those aspects understood 
outside of the subject-environment relation. 
According to Dreyfus, Heidegger ‘has not clearly 
distinguished public space in which entities show 
up for human beings, from the centered spatiality of 
each individual human being’.24 Dreyfus interprets 
regions and the action associated with de-sever-
ance to be ‘public’ and ‘individual’ respectively, but 
we can see this cannot be simply or strictly true. 
Regions in Heidegger are involved in the spaces 
of de-severance itself and ‘ready-to-handness’ and 
‘present-at-handness’ are in fact just two ways of 
seeing the same region. There can therefore be no 
question of giving one priority over the other. There 
is no containment of activities in a public space, 
only spaces generated in actions and these are 
all particular and private in the limited sense that 
they originate in particular situations, while they are 
public in the sense that they participate in intersub-
jective relational totalities. Dreyfus interprets the 
de-severance of Dasein as a ‘function of existential 
concern’25 and worries that multiple individually-
centred people would become windowless monads, 
with no access to any common understanding of the 
world: ‘we would have a number of monads each 
with its own centered experience of presence, and 
public space would be a construct’.26 
Arisaka counter-argues that the chief character of 
the region of Dasein is its indexicality in relation to 
an active and searching centre. ‘What is lacking in 
Dreyfus takes regions to be public in that once they 
are organised and coherent anyone may use them, 
but we can see, that all spaces of action must be 
regions, and this includes public and private spaces 
– the import-export office is a well-organised and 
equipped region, but access to it is regulated and it 
is locked up at the end of the day.
Both the relationality of Leibnitz’s space and the 
subjectivity of Kant’s space are to be found in this 
space, but in such a way that they become insepa-
rable and begin to define the subject and the object 
in relational and situational terms. Subjectivity and 
awareness has become spatialised and distributed 
– taken out of some absolute realm defining self and 
identity – and has become a situated perspective on 
an intersubjective world from which the self presents 
itself and to which things and other subjects are 
disclosed. This situated perspective works across 
regions that are already prepared for particular 
kinds of action – and which are not containers for 
shared activities, but rather repositories of shared 
reference. Everything an active ‘subjectivity’ is 
capable of becomes bracketed by this perspective 
as place and access become politicised – setting 
the framework for Hannah Arendt’s further work on 
appearance and the polis. 
Finding common ground
But when we think of action we are still speaking of 
the integral couple (in intentionality) of subject and 
world, creating a centred space of our own activity, 
organised in a region but centred on a situation or 
centre of action which is our own. These are the 
spaces of our encounter with the world, and espe-
cially with the environments familiar to us – those 
of our own office or workbench, of our own kitchen, 
or of our own mobile phone – though someone else 
may with more or less difficulty use our kitchen or try 
to make a call on our mobile phone. Our own spaces 
are again not neutral or set against our action, they 
are equipped and readied for our action and the 
environments of our actions become conjoined with 
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how such a domain, to some extent abstracted 
from individual actions, comes to be from a primal 
condition of Dasein. Frederick Olafson remarks 
elsewhere: ‘once the concept of an independent 
vorhanden has been admitted, there is no way in 
which one can avoid treating the vorhanden as a 
necessary condition for the zuhanden and the latter 
as thus a derivative, rather than a primary ontologi-
cal concept, as Heidegger evidently intended it to 
be’.30 
The subjectivity in all this lies in an orientation to 
a region of elements constituting and referencing 
a certain action and the directionality and specifi-
city of the action itself. The publicness is a dense 
web of ties to ‘indeterminate others’ that constitutes 
a common world of co-reference. Our actions and 
subjectivities exist in webs of intersubjectivity that 
have a grounding and a levelling effect, creating a 
commons and a public. In fact, in acting, in inter-
acting, in using tools or equipment, Dasein (being 
there) becomes Mitsein (being with) others, even 
when other people are not immediately present 
and when actions do not immediately involve other 
people. The problem of a ‘relation of minds’ does not 
arise because a world common to us all, understood 
and even built as present-at-hand, intervenes. We 
can begin to understand ourselves becoming public 
between things and others in a realm de Certeau 
characterises as ‘the oceanic rumble of the ordinary 
… the place from which discourse is produced’.31 
Common spaces of action
One plugs in fact, not just into regions but also into 
the webs of indexicality, sociality and significance 
invested in them and their elements, as objects 
and people partake in communicative webs of 
co-reference with other objects and people. In our 
regions and places we are constantly involved with 
things and people which refer to other things and 
people, and as Heidegger points out, this involve-
ment may be with indeterminate others. Even 
when there are no other people directly part of any 
… Dreyfus’ account … is the radically perspectival 
or “indexical” feature of regions, which constantly 
refers to Dasein’s orientation’. She notes again that 
such orientation is not private or subjective but is 
positional and perspectival. ‘Regions are public 
because they are based on “one’s” oriented activity, 
as a particular orientation, that can be taken up by 
any Dasein … [and] regions offer a frame of possi-
ble perspectives which give presence a particular 
orientation … So regions are “public” in this limited 
sense of referring to the actions of anyone “plugged 
into” that region’.27 Heidegger himself put it thus: ‘As 
a monad, the Dasein needs no window in order first 
of all to look out toward something outside itself, not 
because, as Leibniz thinks, all beings are already 
accessible within its capsule … but because the 
monad, the Dasein, in its own being is already 
outside, among other beings, and this implies 
always with its own self’.28
But within regions and from the oriented perspec-
tive of Dasein, entities withdraw from view as they 
become part of our actions.29 The bridge, the house, 
the city, as ready-to-hand, dissolve into a totality 
with our action and being. But this totality is also the 
totality of referentiality of the region. Entities refer 
twice therefore: to the ‘subjective’ totality into which 
they disappear in oriented action, and at the same 
time to the objective relationality that draws subject 
and objects together into a region. The former 
process produces readiness-to-hand, the latter a 
presence-at-hand of things constituted in relations. 
People doing things and the things (and places) 
they act on do not exist independently of each other 
in some space, but are rather indissolubly tied up 
with one another in relationships of mutual indexi-
cality. Dreyfus’s claim that regions are ‘independent 
of the locations of people’ or that they are ‘shared’ 
does no justice to the mutually constitutive indexi-
cal nature of relational intersubjectivity. It is in any 
event premature to propose the independence of 
the public domain from the location of particular 
people because Heidegger is trying to show just 
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A shared cultural or professional space, if we look 
at a region like the carpenter’s bench, is something 
that is a factor of the region’s facilitation of particular 
shared practices – and the workbench is a setting, 
regularised and standardised to the support of the 
practice of carpentry. The fact that the carpenter 
makes his own workbench to the support of prac-
tices learned from his master nicely explains how 
regions and actions become joined – the fact that 
he uses a measure clinches the type of space he 
is constructing. Here is where the normalisation of 
space to present-at-hand and eventually to world-
space begins, and this space normalised for the 
practice of carpentry is the workbench. We live in 
a world prepared for our action and ‘equipment is 
its context … every implement exerts a determinate 
and limited range of effects in each instant, and is 
equally determined by the equipment that surrounds 
it’.36 Practices become themselves normalised in 
relation to already mapped out and constructed 
settings. More refined and abstracted practices, like 
the practice of measuring itself, will contribute to a 
further normalisation and ‘worlding’ of space. This 
is the vorhanden space that facilitates a particular 
Dasein for a particular skilled practitioner, who needs 
to rely on his equipment in action. This makes the 
space ‘public’ in the sense that it becomes common 
to a practice, and shared by a bounded group of 
people who have both access to and the skills to 
use that space. 
There is something a little strange and circular 
about these equipped, user-included totalities we 
call regions however, because we find ourselves 
acting in a world to a very significant extent prepared 
and ‘made to measure’ for practices already prac-
ticed.37 Here, if we take Heidegger’s example of 
the carpenter’s workbench, we can begin to see 
how a regularisation of the equipment and the work 
processes using that equipment could mean that 
indeed, a carpenter, with a few adjustments and 
adaptations, could begin work on another carpen-
ter’s bench. It would be the same for a professional 
particular action, the elements of regions are them-
selves already ‘socialised’ by being made part of a 
whole that communicates through cross-linking with 
other wholes that involve people.32 Taking a simple 
example: a chair may be involved directly in a 
particular action, but it participates by analogy with 
other similar actions involving chairs through time 
– the chair comes to the action already marked by 
its significance as a chair. Actions and objects form 
relational totalities that are significant and which 
are ‘disclosed … with a certain intelligibility’33 and 
regions become the backgrounds against which 
people act and are ‘that wherein the intelligibility of 
anything is sustained’.34 
The world is already intelligible and significant to 
us, intelligibility coming with the process of disclo-
sure in an integral whole. And action doesn’t just 
happen in a space of communicative intersubjec-
tivity, it finds itself involved with and supported by 
countless items of equipment involved (right along-
side the actor) in the cybernetic totality of the action. 
This equipment includes multitudes of things that 
escape our attention precisely because they are 
ready-to-hand (until they break down and reveal 
their presence to us): floors, keys, doors, spectacles, 
walls, switches, ventilators, corridors, chairs, bicycle 
paths, bus timetables, fish tanks, restaurant menus, 
watches, knees, mobile telephones. We incorporate 
multitudes of things in use in our lives on an every-
day basis, things that we both count on and take for 
granted. ‘Heidegger shows that we normally do not 
deal with entities as aggregates of natural physical 
mass, but rather as a range of functions or effects 
that we rely upon. … For the most part, objects are 
implements taken for granted, a vast environmental 
backdrop supporting the thin and volatile layer of 
our explicit activities. … The totality of equipment is 
the world; not as a sum of ontic gears and levers, 
nor as an empty horizon in which tool-pieces are 
situated, but as that unitary execution in which the 
entire ontic realm is already dissolved’.35 
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public and the private remain a contingent matter of 
access and rights, and the politics of their construc-
tion, negotiation, contestation and placement in 
wider webs of intersubjectivity.
Spatialities of appearance and everydayness
Notwithstanding what I have said about access and 
rights to particular spaces for action, publicness is 
also a factor of the gathering together of people 
who in this way encounter and are disclosed to one 
another. This disclosure will itself be constitutive of 
a ‘public’ and a public life depending for its realisa-
tion on the presence of others. For Hannah Arendt, 
the polis is the space ‘where I appear to others as 
others appear to me, where men exist not merely 
like other living or inanimate things, but to make 
their appearance explicitly’.38 This is where we do 
things humanly, and through living between others 
become the kinds of creatures we are. In particu-
lar, for Arendt, this is the space created as people 
gather together ‘in speech and action’. The space 
itself exists according to Arendt only as words and 
deeds – apparently therefore as a collective ready-
to-hand space of communicative action. It exists as 
‘a power potential ... [that] springs up between men 
when they act together and vanishes the moment 
they disperse’.39 But these ready-to-hand spaces of 
mutual communication, recognition and negotiation 
will also be supported by equipped present-at-
hand spaces prepared for this gathering of people 
in mutual disclosure. Arendt mentions places like 
the town hall, the legislative assembly, the agora – 
these are implements of mutual disclosure, places 
equipped for politics and talk. 
The action of gathering here is one that requires a 
common intention, which is that of coming together 
to talk; there is a common reason to gather and 
a common place of gathering. The space of the 
gathering is therefore centred, drawing all with the 
common intention to a central place which will itself 
be a bounded region of talkers. When Arendt is 
most specific about the space of her public, she is 
cook in another cook’s kitchen – but probably less so 
for the kitchen of the enthusiastic but undisciplined 
amateur! The spaces for action are already at least 
partly prepared against the breakdown of action 
– and the actions become transportable to other 
places where the skills and settings exist. Spaces 
are concrete settings constructed and formed to 
regularised ‘cultural’ and ‘everyday’ practices, and 
even more so perhaps when we consider special-
ised and professionalised practices. We could also 
imagine regularised and less specialised spaces 
for action, for more generic activities and practices 
like walking in the city. It is this ‘preparation’ that I 
am taking to be the most important character of the 
vorhanden spaces we use.
It is difficult to see therefore where in the region of 
space itself we could find a character or marker for 
publicness or privateness. Publicness and private-
ness will be a matter of access to different sets 
of mutually referring ‘implements’ held in different 
spatial ‘commons’ – access therefore for different 
‘publics’ to the prepared vorhanden spaces facilitat-
ing specific or generic practices. The preparedness 
of regions means that qualities and degrees of 
publicness will be factored into that preparation. 
While both public and private spaces are necessarily 
‘shared’ or ‘common’ by virtue of the communicative 
regions all actions are necessarily part of – they are 
more or less accessible to, or secured against, the 
access of those included or excluded from a partic-
ular ‘commons’. It may be decided for example that 
slaves and women are simply not ‘public’! Some 
regions will be prepared for a broad public, others 
will be secured (and all too many are today) and will 
be ‘public’ to a select few. We can begin to see how 
the domains of ‘public’ and ‘private’ become contin-
gent on practices of publicness as well as the rights 
and provisions of access made for different people 
to different equipped and facilitating regions. The 
confusion about Heidegger’s understanding of the 
public and the private may be cleared up when we 
resist finding any essential public and private: the 
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realm.42 Indeed many cities, and all great trading 
cities through history have managed to cope with 
more or less success with the problem of sharing 
a space between people of different cultures and 
practices.
In this case people, involved in their own affairs 
and moving between places significant first and 
foremost in their individual life narratives and trajec-
tories, become caught up incidentally together in a 
common space. The space itself becomes a carrier 
for the lives of multiple diverse others; it becomes 
a common background of intelligibility, supporting 
multiple intentions without itself directly forming any 
of them. It draws people together in inhabiting the 
same place in diversity and difference. This is the 
cosmopolitan setting where others and their lives 
are constantly visible in our own lives, adding colour 
and vibrancy and a certain friction of difference to 
the everyday scene which stimulates the senses 
and awakens awareness of the relativity of our 
own habits. Arendt on the one hand sees the polis 
as a bounded realm of talk comprising a bounded 
community of talkers in a bounded space. The 
public realm is of a singular politic: ‘This wall-like 
law was sacred, but only the inclosure was politi-
cal. Without it a public realm could no more exist 
than a piece of property without a fence to hedge 
it in’.43 On the other hand she elaborates a diffuse 
space of appearance, putting appearance itself now 
right at the centre of a public life in which ‘Being and 
Appearing coincide. … Nothing and nobody exists 
in this world whose very being does not presuppose 
a spectator. In other words, nothing that is, insofar 
as it appears, exists in the singular; everything that 
is is meant to be perceived by somebody. Not Man 
but men inhabit this planet. Plurality is the law of 
the earth’.44 In a world of appearance, there is no 
subject that is not also an object whose identity is 
affirmed and ‘objectified’ in recognition. 
Arendt finds, in an everyday that like Olafson’s 
depends on being with others, a life and a politics 
speaking of Athens with its centrally placed agora, 
to which ‘free men’ and some of the not so free 
gather to argue, discuss and gossip, and buy and 
sell. For her, the centre was also defined by its limit, 
and ‘the law of the city-state was … quite literally 
a wall, without which there might have been and 
agglomeration of houses, a town, but not a city; a 
political community’.40 The space itself is prepared 
and formed to the practice of a particular politics of 
a particular and bounded ‘public’, and the space as 
much as the politics includes or excludes people 
depending on whether they can or may partake in 
these practices.
But this can hardly be the whole story: there is 
another space of gathering in Arendt’s writing which 
occurs in a quite different space held in common. 
Here it is no immediate common purpose, and no 
explicit meeting or agonism of minds that draws 
people together. What they gather around is instead 
simply the world that they hold in common between 
themselves – that they all nevertheless see and act 
in differently as they draw different elements of it 
into orbits of different lives and intentions. We hear 
also from Arendt that ‘to live together in the world 
means essentially that a world of things is between 
those who have it in common, as a table is located 
between those who sit around it; the world like every 
in-between, relates and separates men at the same 
time’.41 When different things in this world of things 
are accessed by different people in movement with 
different intentions, the space unlike that of the agora 
or the assembly, is a distributed decentred space. 
Here the space distributes people between places 
and it is the in-between itself, rather than particu-
lar places or things involved in people’s actions and 
intentions, that becomes the locus of an incidental, 
unfocused encounter between people of different 
intent. Much has been written more recently about a 
‘politics of difference’, addressing the issue of multi-
culturality and the rights of people unassimilated to 
a dominant cultural setting (immigrants in Western 
cities for example) to participate in an open public 
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people. They may in other words themselves take 
on different positions in the lives of different people 
engaged in different and differently valourised prac-
tices. They hold the potential to be positive places 
of appearance and copresence between different 
people or equally to become places which gather 
value to themselves in a winner-takes-all centralis-
ing dynamic. Power can be a factor that accrues 
over time to central places, even in an initially open 
and ‘democratic’ space – relegating more marginal 
activities to more marginal spaces. We may see all 
this play out in an ‘agonism’ of lively and colourful 
‘contestation’ of public space, with marginal and 
central places coexisting in a polarized and ener-
gized proximity. Or we may see peripheral places 
banished to a ‘safer’ distance, and drop out of view 
from the perspective of the centre, to perhaps later 
erupt without warning as people deprived of the 
‘reality’ and visibility of centrality reassert their rights 
and make themselves visible in less positive ways. 
This dynamic of ‘place becoming’ is therefore crea-
tive, but neither neutral nor intrinsically ‘democratic’. 
It retains powerful potentials for the hardening of 
power inequalities in space and place.
The city as instrument of knowledge and 
memory
Don Ihde draws attention back to the relational 
essence and the technicity that he sees underlying the 
phenomenological position and phenomenological 
space, something we find already being developed 
in Heidegger’s Being and Time. He sees our knowl-
edge and practices founded in the instrumentality 
of our equipped and prepared spaces. The spaces 
we prepare for use and occupation are fabrications 
for particular practices and ways of life. The objects 
in such spaces partake of relational totalities (prac-
tices and their settings) – and are disclosed to us 
in those totalities. As Ihde points out, ‘Heidegger 
inverts the long primacy of objects of knowledge as 
the primary constituents of the world …  In this tool 
analysis he argues that not only are such praxes 
closer to us, but that only by a kind of rupture in 
of presentation, in the auspices not of a singular 
political law and territory but in the diverse practices 
of life itself. This is a politics of the public and its 
appearance and display that works between people 
and from the ‘value of the surface’45 rather than from 
a ‘deeper’ structural law of a singular and universal-
ised practice of the public. It is distributed between 
the surfaces of things and people, filling space in 
its enactment – but also necessarily differentiat-
ing it in the process. It works not by valorising and 
marking places as ‘political’ at the outset, but by 
finding places becoming political as incidents in and 
expressions of everyday life. Classical Athens was 
a bounded space walled and centred on its agora, 
gathering people in common purpose and a common 
politic to a centre. This other space is a grid set out 
between places, facilitating divergent purposes in a 
region of places held in common between people. 
People find themselves in the presence of a public 
of anonymous others, each engaged in their own 
immediate concerns and only coincidentally partici-
pating in a common life between places held in 
common. We enter here a realm of walkers not 
assimilated to a singular practice of the public or 
required to perform that practice to participate in a 
spatial politics – this is the democratic space of an 
everyday which includes all whether they opt into a 
dominant discourse or not – but it is also a space 
which may secrete a politics of power and presence 
behind a naturalised and habitual everyday in which 
all appears to be just as it is. 
This walker is not Arendt’s ‘free man’ so much as 
an anonymous participant inhabiting a body politic 
through his or her unremarked presence in a life 
of the city. This open public space is the spatial 
institution of the city in its diverse immediate and 
everyday affairs, but it is also one whose places 
will become differently valorised and differenti-
ated in use and in the qualities and amenities they 
offer different people. The spaces between places 
themselves become places whose value is deter-
mined by the passage and presence of particular 
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– the technical object … it becomes the interface 
through which the human … enters into relation 
with the milieu’.47 Our further research depends 
on this understanding that we inhabit technical 
systems which themselves constitute ‘stabilisations 
of technical evolution around points of equilibrium 
concretized by particular technologies’.48 To under-
stand the city as a problem of human inhabitation 
it is this interface that must be the focus of our 
ongoing work.
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